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          “Freiheit ist immer die des 
Andersdenkenden.“ 
          “Freedom is always the freedom 
dissent.“ 






Corpus Christi is the name of a city in Texas, on the border with Mexico. Corpus Christi is 
also the deliberately ambiguous title of a play by . The play takes up the New 
Testament depiction of life, work and suffering of Jesus, whereby a particularly large space is 
dedicated to the Lord's Supper. However, the story is set in the city of Corpus Christi in the 
1950s and 1960s. Jesus appears under the name Joshua as a homosexual and uses a crude 
and obscene language. While public protests in some southern German cities (e.g. Karlsruhe, 
Ulm, Pforzheim) led to the play being cancelled, other theatre directors (e.g. in Tübingen) 
stuck to their schedule. 
Such creations are not isolated cases, as other examples prove, such as the rock musical 
“The Maria Syndrome“1 or a T-shirt offered for sale on the Internet with the image of a cross 
to which a pig was nailed.2  That their creators were seriously concerned with Christian content 
can rarely be claimed. Rather, the desire for provocation and scandal is in the foreground and 
also regularly leads to the required result, an outraged outcry of those, who would rather bear 
 
  1 See also OVG Koblenz, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1997, p. 1174 et seqq.; BVerwG, NJW 
1999, p. 304 et seqq. 
  2 See also OLG Nürnberg, Neue Zeitschrit für Strafrecht – Rechtsprechungsreport (NStZ-RR) 1999, p. 
 
 
a personal injury than let contents of faith that are sacred to them be dragged through the 
mud. Whoever then takes up his pen and protests publicly, runs the additional risk of being 
accused by the sharp-tongued advocates of breaking the taboo of narrow-mindedness and 
intolerance. The laughing third party in this debate is often the author, whose work, which is 
in itself quite weak-breasted, receives welcome publicity and whose box office is ringing richly 
due to the numerous encouragement of all those who, if only because it is “in“, attend the 
corresponding performances. 
The understandable desire for criminal prosecution is only rarely satisfied, which is expressed 
in mass criminal charges. Most of the preliminary proceedings concerning sec. 166 German 
Criminal Code (Revielement of relgious faiths and religious and ideological communities) have 
already been discontinued by the public prosecutor's offices. If there is nevertheless a trial, the 
perpetrator may hope for leniency,3 since the act of “insulting“ as well as the “suitability for 
disturbing the peace“ in sec. 166 German Criminal Code opens a wide scope for subjective 
evaluation by the judge. 
In order to remedy the alleged persecution deficit, a change in the law has already been 
proposed several times. For example, the amendment of criminal law “Entwurf eines 
Strafrechtsänderungsgesetzes (Stärkung des Toleranzgebotes durch einen besseren Schutz 
religiöser und weltanschaulicher Überzeugungen gemäß § 166 StGB) “ of the CDU/CSU 
parliamentary group of 7 November 2000 suggested deleting the suitability clause in 
paragraphs 1 and 2.4 A later initiative of the Free State of Bavaria via the Bundesrat proposed 
in a new paragraph 3 an “interpretation aid“ for the disturbance of peace.5  The opportunity 
for this may have been provided by the Muhammad cartoons, which were printed in the 
 
239 et seqq. 
  3 The number of convictions under sections 166, 167 has been below 20 persons for years. In 2017 10 
persons were sentenced. (See Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden, Strafverfolgung, Tab. 2.1). 
  4 BT-Drucks. 14/4558; Previously, precursors with largely identical contents had not been successful, cf. 
BR-Drucks. 367/86, see critical , Die Eignung, den öffentlichen Frieden zu stören, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Strafrecht (NStZ) 1988, p. 159 et seqq. – trigger at that time was the feature film “Das Gespenst“ of Herbert 
 from 1983, – and BR-Drucks. 460/98; BT-Drucks. 13/10666 – unsuccessful. 
  5 BR-Drucks. 683/07. 
 
 
Danish daily newspaper Jyllands-Posten in September 2005 and then caused outrage 
worldwide, including among Muslims in Germany, in 2006.6 
A comparative legal analysis shows that similar offences are applied in Austria and 
Switzerland. Sec.  188 of the Austrian German Criminal Code punishes the “vilification of 
religious teachings“, Art 261 of the Swiss Criminal Code punishes the disturbance of freedom 
of belief and worship, but with a significantly lower penalty. In 2005, the European Court of 
Human Rights considered the criminal conviction of a publisher in Turkey for insulting the 
Prophet to be compatible with Article 10 ECHR (guarantee of freedom of opinion).7 On the 
other hand, Portuguese criminal law does not provide for a comparable criminal offence 
without chaos and revolt having broken out there. 
The demands for stricter punishment of blasphemous utterances are regularly justified by 
recourse to a general principle of tolerance derived from Article 4 (2) of the Basic Law.8 
However, this does not yet answer the question of when the limits of tolerance are exceeded. 
This question seems to lead to a paradox: If the transgression of the limits is supposed to 
result in the use of criminal law, and thus intolerance towards those who stand beyond these 
limits and are marked by them as “intolerant“, there is no “genuine“ tolerance at all. Rather, 
the concept of tolerance turns into intolerance.9 On closer inspection, however, it is not a 
specific problem of tolerance, but a general phenomenon of every legislation. Since rights are 
only appear on paper if they are not secured by state-organized coercion, their limitation is 
already immanent to every right: “Thus, the right is at the same time a power to force those 
who violate it, according to the principle of contradiction.“10 It is decisive whether the mutual 
 
  6 However, the draft law only emphasizes the protection of Christian confessions. 
  7 ECHR, Judgment 13.9.2005 – 42571/98 (I.A. c Turkey), sections 23-32, however, with a narrow 
majority of 4 : 3 judge´s votes. 
  8 Cf. BT-Drucks. 14/4558, p. 4; BR-Drucks. 683/07, p. 2 refers without constitutional foundation to a 
draft criminal law from 1962 and thus proves to be a grip in the moth box of criminal policy. 
  9 Cf.  There´s No Such Thing as Free Speech and it´s a Good Thing, Too, 1994, p. 134 et seqq. 
  10 , Metaphysik der Sitten (1797), in: Kants gesammelte Schriften. Published by Königlich 
Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Erste Abteilung, Band 6, Berlin 1907, p. 203 (231): “Mithin ist 
dem Rechte zugleich eine Befugnis, den, der ihm Abbruch tut, zu zwingen, nach dem Satze des Widerspruchs 
verknüpft.“ Before this, it says: “If a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom according to the 
 
 
limits of the law have been drawn in a legitimate way. 
Thus, the first question that arises is what idea of tolerance was the basis of the proposals 
to tighten sec. 166 German Criminal Code (II.). It must also be clarified whether intolerant 
statements may also be reacted to with intolerance (III.). The answers to these questions 
finally lead to a more precise definition of the legal interest protected by sec. 166 German 
Criminal Code and the expression of public peace (IV.), whereby the final question arises, 
however, whether this norm is necessary at all (V). 
 
 
II. Four Concepts of Tolerance 
 
 Three elements are essential for tolerance:11 Firstly, there must be a dissent between a 
tolerating and a tolerated group with regard to a particular value. Secondly, the tolerating 
group must consider the opposite position to be negative in some sense. Therefore tolerance 
does not  mean indifference. Those who are indifferent to another view do not practice 
tolerance. Therefore, the renunciation of criticism is not a characteristic of a tolerant attitude. 
The limit is only crossed when not only the content of the statement is disputed, but also the 
right itself to express a certain meaning. Thirdly, the tolerating group must be able to express 
its rejection, because otherwise it is not a matter of (justified) acquiescence, but of simple 
submission. 
 In addition to this general characterization, several concepts of tolerance can be 
 
general laws (which is in the wrong), the compulsion, which is opposed to it, as the prevention of a hindrance to 
freedom is consistent with freedom according to general laws, which is in the right.“ – “... wenn ein gewisser 
Gebrauch der Freiheit selbst Hindernis der Freiheit nach allgemeinen Gesetzen (d.i. unrecht) ist, so ist der Zwang, 
der diesem entgegengesetzt wird, als Verhinderung eines Hindernisses der Freiheit mit der Freiheit nach 
allgemeinen Gesetzen zusammenstimmend, d.i. recht.“  See more , Hindering a Hindrance to Freedom, 
Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 16 (2008), p. 227 (232 et seqq.). 
  11 Cf. , Toleranz, in: Mittelstraß (Publisher), Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, 
Bd. 4, 1996. 
 
 
distinguished.12 First of all, tolerance can denote the relationship between a majority or 
authority and a minority. Although the majority has the power to take action against the 
minority position and to enforce at least external conformity, it refrains, for whatever reason – 
possibly because the minority cannot seriously endanger the power position of the majority – 
from enforcing its convictions by force. While in this first “permission concept“13 there can be 
no talk of equal rights for the competing positions, this is different in the second, the 
“coexistence concept“.14 Here the power relations between the competing groups are more or 
less equally distributed. The tolerance relation is thus reciprocal: Those who tolerate are 
simultaneously tolerated. In contrast to the first two concepts of tolerance, which primarily 
justify tolerance with pragmatic-instrumental considerations, the third, the “concept of 
respect“,15 assumes that the changing respect of tolerating persons is morally justified. The 
different groups recognize each other as autonomous and equal members of a society based 
on the rule of law. Despite considerable differences in their ethical convictions, the others are 
accepted as morally and legally equal, so that the legal order of society should not favour any 
ethical position over the other. Finally, the fourth concept is the “concept of appreciation“,16 
the most demanding form of mutual recognition. It goes beyond respecting other convictions 
as legally and politically equal and demands that opposing positions be valued as ethically 
valuable.17 But in order to be able to speak of tolerance here at all with regard to the rejection 
component, the appreciation must be limited in the sense that the other way of life is not 
considered as good as one's own. 
 The demand for a tightening of sec. 166 German Criminal Code might be closest to the 
 
  12 See more to the following , Toleranz, Gerechtigkeit und Vernunft, in: same (Publisher), Toleranz, 
2000, p. 119 (123 et seqq.). 
  13 Ibid., p. 124. 
  14 Ibid., p. 125. 
  15 Ibid., p. 127. 
  16 Ibid., p. 129. 
  17 See also in this sense , Rechtsphilosophie, 1997, p. 329; Cf. also  Maximen 
und Reflexionen, in: Werke, Bd. 6, 1981, p. 507: “Toleranz sollte nur eine vorübergehende Gesinnung sein; sie 
muß zur Anerkennung führen. Dulden heißt beleidigen.“ – “Tolerance should only be a temporary attitude; it 
must lead to recognition. To tolerate is to insult.“ 
 
 
“concept of esteem“, since an insulting reduction of the counter position is incompatible with 
the evaluation as ethically valuable. According to the “concept of respect“, on the other hand, 
even a strongly recorded and derogatory statement does not yet violate the duty of tolerance, 
since the recognition as legally-politically equivalent is not yet called into question or the 
others are denied the realisation of their conviction. Unfairness and intolerance are not 
identical. 
 Which concept of tolerance is most appropriate for a liberal society? Materially founded 
conceptions are preferable to purely pragmatically founded conceptions, since they do not lead 
to a stable condition in which mutual trust can develop. For as soon as the suppression of an 
opposing position is possible without disadvantages or the balance of power has changed in 
favour of a group, the essential reasons for tolerance cease to exist. It is questionable, 
however, whether the ethically densest concept of mutual appreciation should be chosen. Even 
if it is morally preferable, because it is one of the conditions that make pluralist democracy 
possible, it should not be made the object of the legal system, because the law is content with 
the external legality of an act, regardless of the internal attitude of the actor:18 “The mere 
conformity or non-conformity of an act with the law, regardless of its motive, is called legality; 
but the one in which the idea of the duty under the law is also the motive of the act, is called 
morality.“19 In this respect, however, it is sufficient, in accordance with the principle of the 
greatest possible equal freedom,20 that the contracting parties grant each other their different 
views, regardless of their valuation. 
 Even if a statement – regardless of the concept of tolerance – is to be assessed as 
intolerant, the question is still open how to react to it legitimately. 
 
  18 Also , Toleranz: Zur politischen Legitimation der Moderne, in:  (Fn. 12), p. 60 (74 et seqq.). 
  19  (Fn. 10), p. 219: “Man nennt die bloße Übereinstimmung oder Nichtübereinstimmung einer 
Handlung mit dem Gesetze, ohne Rücksicht auf die Triebfeder derselben, die Legalität (Gesetzmäßigkeit); 
diejenige aber, in welcher die Idee der Pflicht aus dem Gesetze zugleich die Triebfeder der Handlung ist, die 
Moralität (Sittlichkeit) derselben.“ 
  20 See  (Fn. 10), p. 230: “Eine jede Handlung ist recht, die oder nach deren Maxime die Freiheit der 
Willkür eines jeden mit jedermanns Freiheit nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze zusammen bestehen kann.“ – 





III. Locke – Mill - Rawls 
 
 The question of whether intolerance can be rewarded with intolerance21 is to be 
investigated –  – by taking a look at three legal philosophers who are 
representatives of the idea of tolerance. 
 It is a small irony of history that one of the great enlighteners and pioneers of tolerance, 
, thought just towards Catholics no tolerance was possible. So churches could not 
be tolerated in the state whose members were at the same time obliged by their faith to a 
foreign sovereign – the Pope.22  argument is admittedly directed against his position 
itself, because with the same reason Anglicans in a Catholic state might be refused tolerance. 
In this way  cannot develop a general duty of tolerance. The question of the deeper 
reason for the lifting of tolerance commandment is of greater interest for our context.  
According to , no practical opinion that contradicts the possibility of human or civil 
existence is to be tolerated.23 Freedom is thus restricted because of assumed negative 
consequences for public order. In contrast, state coercion is inadmissible in the face of 
behaviour that does not violate the rights of others and is not aimed at dominating others.24  
 
with everyone´s freedom according to a general law.“ 
  21 For it see , Der philosophische Glaube, 1948, p. 73; , Der Mensch im Recht, 3rd ed. 
1969, p. 86. 
  22  A Letter concerning Toleration (1689), in: The Works of John Locke, London 1823, Vol. VI, S. 
46: “Again: That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, which is constituted upon such a 
bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby, , deliver themselves up to the protection and service 
of another prince.“ , Du Contrat social ou principes du droit politique, 1762, chapter 8, wanted to go 
even further; he will not tolerate a religion according to which there is no salvation outside the church. 
  23  (Fn. 22), p. 45: “No opinions contrary to human society, or those moral rules which are 
necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate.“ Thus also atheists hope for 
tolerance, because unbelief in God is tantamout to the denial of all human expedience – a consequence of his 
assumption that the moral law is based on the will of God (see the same, 6th Essay On the Law of Nature). 
  24  (Fn. 22), p. 47: “As for other practical opinions, though not absolutely free from all error, yet if 




 This classically liberal view is expanded in particular by . He considers 
restrictions of freedom of speech through coercion only legitimate in order to “prevent harm to 
others.“25  considers the damage to legitimate, legally protected interests to be relevant.26 
This already anticipates the punch line of the discussion of legal interests that began in the 
30s of the 19th century.27  is against allowing freedom of speech only under the condition 
that the limits of fair discussion are not exceeded.28 In his view, the limits of fairness are 
difficult to define, which is why there is a danger that they will be set by the majority at the 
expense of the minority. This idea can also be applied to sec. 166 German Criminal Code. The 
customary definition of insult as any crude expression of disregard, particularly offensive in 
form or content, through the assertion of an insulting fact or a derogatory value judgement,29 
certainly cannot be taken as a model of how the subject matter of prohibition is predictably 
clear and unambiguously defined for everyone, especially when the circumstances of the 
individual case are to be decisive.30 However, a different consideration seems to be more 
important. According to , the correct reaction to unfairness is to make the manner of the 
debate a public issue.31 Behind this, there is the recognition of each individual as a 
responsible citizen, which is constitutive for a free society. It can therefore be trusted that the 
discourse will expose the unfairness as such and thus discredit the offensive assertion itself. 
 The short foray through the history of ideas of tolerance is to be concluded with 
. In his opinion, the intolerant should not complain if he himself is treated intolerantly.32 
 But intolerance as such does not yet justify its suppression. Rather, the restriction of freedom 
 
  25 , On Liberty, 1859, p. 22. 
  26 Ibid., p. 134 f.; see also , Liberale Toleranz und Meinungsfreiheit. Prinzipielle und 
wertbezogene Argumentationen, in:  (Publisher), Integration oder Toleranz, 2001, p. 88 (92 
et seqq.). 
  27 The creator of the term is , Ueber das Erforderniß einer Rechtsverletzung zum Begriffe des 
Verbrechens, Archiv des Criminalrechts 1834, p. 149 et seqq.; see more to the history of dogma: , 
Rechtsgüterschutz und Schutz der Gesellschaft, 1972. 
  28  (Fn. 25), p. 95 et seqq. 
  29 Cf. OLG Celle, NJW 1986, p. 1275 f.; OLG Nürnberg, NStZ-RR 1999, p. 239. 
  30 OLG Karlsruhe, NStZ 1986, 363 (364). 
  31  (Fn. 25), p. 97 f. 
 
 
of speech must be just, i.e. compatible with the principle of the greatest possible equality of 
freedom.33 Only a threat to the freedom of others, or to the liberal constitution itself, 
legitimises the restriction of the freedom of intolerant persons.34   In a society in which public 
discourse functions – here: in which blasphemous utterances meet with public criticism – 
these conditions will regularly not yet exist. 
 However, the liberal emphasis on the freedom of the individual and the resulting 
requirement for tolerance is countered by the fact that no society can survive with merely 
formal criteria of justice – and tolerance was also determined here in a purely formal way. 
Rather, liberal democracy also lives from the agreement of its citizens on final matters.35 
Consequently, the ideological neutrality of the state embodied in Article 4 of the Basic Law 
must be rejected as an error. Corresponding voices for the use of (criminal) law for the 
protection of fundamental values are particularly loud in times in which a general decline in 
values is thought to be evident. What education and socialisation have not achieved is now to 
be achieved by state pressure. But the debate on the “Leitkultur“ has shown that a 
corresponding basic consensus is not easily reached and that such questions are excellently 
suited to be the subject of political propaganda. 
 Surprisingly, this criticism seems to be compatible with the principle of damage stressed 
by , because according to her premises the community is threatened with damage if the 
value convictions that constitute it dissolve. According to the principle of damage, this danger 
should then be countered with the means of legal compulsion. In such a conception, however, 
a naive overestimation of the possibilities of the legal system is revealed. Criminal law in 
 
  32 , A Theory of Justice (1971), reprint 2005, p. 190 f. 
  33 For  (Fn. 32), p. 47 et passim, one of the two principles of justice. 
  34 Ibid., p. 193; also  (Fn. 17), p. 334 f. 
  35 Cf. , Is Patriotism a Virtue?, 1984, p. 8 et seqq.; Taylor,  Cross-purposes: The Liberal-
Communitarian debate, in: Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life, 2013, p. 159 (165 et seqq.).84 
(90 et seqq.). The criticism of the human image of liberalism and the individualistic approach to the justification 
of the right can already be found at , Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, published by Eduard Gans, 2nd 
ed. 1840, sections 144 et seqq. 
 
 
particular has no moral force. Rather, it ties in with already existing social values.36 As the 
development of sections 218 et seq. of the German Criminal Code shows, disappearing values 
cannot be kept artificially alive over a long period of time by means of the law. Rather, a legal 
system that seeks to enforce its standards against the widespread conviction of citizens puts its 
authority at risk. Furthermore, the pluralistic state refrains from controlling its own conditions 
of existence precisely for the sake of freedom, on the one hand because this high regard for 
freedom determines its self-image, and on the other hand out of the hope of convincing 
people of the advantages of a liberal constitution precisely because of this. 
 
 
IV. The Limits to Freedom of Expression 
 
 These considerations give rise to the limits of freedom of expression. They are initially 
exceeded where others are disparaged in their person. Without mutual respect as persons, 
living together in a society is not possible. Mutual recognition as persons – and thus as 
discussants – is also a prerequisite for open competition of opinions. The required tolerance is 
therefore violated if the other is no longer taken seriously as a partner in this dispute. This 
aspect of human dignity is covered by the criminal offences for the protection of honour 
(sections 185 ff. German Criminal Code).37  
 The problem with sec. 166 German Criminal Code, however, is that the incriminated 
statement in the concrete situation lacks any reference to specific living persons. Tasteless 
distortions of religious or ideological content do not regularly constitute a disparagement of 
individuals or groups38 who follow the conviction in question. This objective reference is 
expressed in the peace protection clause, which, however, needs to be concretised. Thus it is 
 
  36 , Die Genese eines Straftatbestandes, Juristische Schulung 1978, p. 8 (11). 
  37 To the protected property of sections 185 et seqq. See instead of many  in: 
Schönke/Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch, 30th ed. 2019, before sect. 185 et seqq. marginal no. 1 with further ref. 
  38 On the insulting ability of communities of persons see BGHSt 36, p. 83 (88);  
(Fn. 37), before sect. 185 et seqq. marginal no. 3 with further ref. 
 
 
not convincing when, usually with reference to the wording of the law, public peace is 
regarded as the legal good protected by sec. 166 German Criminal Code.39 Public peace is 
usually defined as the state of general legal certainty and the peaceful coexistence of citizens 
(objective element) as well as the confidence of the population in the continuation of this state 
(subjective element).40 Thus, however, the special feature of sec. 166 German Criminal Code 
remains in the dark. Understood as an objective assurance by law, public peace is disturbed 
by every breach of law. Sec. 166 would therefore be superfluous.41 The conventional 
conception leads furthermore into an antinomy, comparable to “  antinomy“: Just as 
little as the quantity of all quantities can be represented,42 the legal system can be 
represented as an interest legally protected by itself.43 The impairment of the subjective trust 
in legal certainty as a possible socio-psychological effect of a norm violation is a secondary 
phenomenon, but not the norm violation itself.44  
 There is no way out if the contents of religious and ideological confessions are regarded 
as social conditions that are to be assigned to the core area of personal dignity and freedom, 
the respect of which is a prerequisite for peaceful coexistence in a society. Even if the confessor 
experiences them as directly constituting his personality,45 a general legal duty to exercise 
restraint with regard to things that are sacred to others46 is not to be recognised. The same 
reasons speak against it as were already put forward above against the narrow concept of the 
value of tolerance. If the protection against punishment is to be reduced to a socially 
 
  39 Cf. OLG Köln, NJW 1982, p. 657;  (Fn. 37), before sect. 166 et seqq. marginal 
no. 2 with further ref. 
  40 See BGHSt 16, p. 49 (56);  (Fn. 37), before sect. 126 marginal no. 1 
with further ref. 
  41 Rightly critical , NStZ 1988, p. 161 f. 
  42 See , Basic Set Theorie, 1979, p. 6 f. 
  43 See more , Notstand und Notwehr, 1994, p. 81 f. 
  44 , Zum Begriff des Rechtsguts, Festschrift für Lenckner, 1998, p. 377 (386). 
  45 In this sense, for a right to recognition , Der Strafgrund der Bekenntnisbeschimpfung, Festschrift 
für Küper, 2007, p. 411 (421 et seqq.); , Der Tatbestand der Bekenntnisbeschimpfung (§ 166 StGB) 
als Herausforderung der Rechtsgutslehre, Festschrift für Kargl, 2015, p. 573 (584 f.). 
  46 See also E 1962, BT-Drs. IV/650, p. 342, whose idea has just not become law; See BT-Drs. V/4094, 
p. 28 et seqq. 
 
 
acceptable minimum of respect and tolerance,47 it remains open from where this minimum 
can be derived. 
 After all this, all that remains is the reference to an – equally indeterminable – control 
of punishability?48 The key to the explanation of sec. 166 German Criminal Code lies in the 
liberal justification of tolerance. In the pluralistic society, in which nobody can claim the 
monopoly on truth, mutual tolerance is the constituent of the open discourse of everyone with 
everyone else. A statement can then no longer be accepted as part of the public discourse if 
the discrimination of the opposing position is intended to exclude its representatives and thus 
to silence them.49 The number of people who follow the reviled conviction is irrelevant50 – 
tolerance is intended above all to protect minorities – as is the possibility that the adherents 
of the attacked confession could become violent,51 because the state must protect freedom of 
speech against violence if necessary. The public peace in sec. 166 German Criminal Code thus 
describes the conditions of plurality. A disturbance of the peace is therefore to be assumed 
when people have to fear discrimination and disadvantages in their environment because of 
their convictions. For (only) then there is the danger that they no longer dare to live their 
world view publicly and to stand up for it. Sec. 166 German Criminal Code thus wants to 
prevent the destruction of plurality itself and in this way ultimately serves the freedom of 
religion and ideology of Article 4.1 of the Basic Law itself. 
On the other hand, anyone who wants to delete the peace disturbance clause without 
substitution calls into question the only legitimate protective purpose of sec. 166 German 
Criminal Code. Significantly, the supporters of the increase of penalty admitted that the 
amended provision was also intended to protect religious sensibilities – although, as they 
 
  47 Cf.  (Fn. 37), before sect. 166 et seqq. marginal no. 2; , Die 
Beschimpfung von Religionsgesellschaften gemäß § 166 StGB – eine Würdigung des Karikaturenstreits nach 
deutschem Strafrecht, Juristische Rundschau 2006, p. 495 (496). 
  48 See  NStZ 1988, p. 163. 
  49 Cf. also OLG Karlsruhe, NStZ 1986, p. 365 with note ; as well as – in the end doubtful – OLG 
Celle, NStZ 1986, 1276; OLG Nürnberg, NStZ-RR 1999, 240. 
  50 See, however  (Fn. 37), sect. 166 marginal no. 12. 
  51 Ibid. 
 
 
stated, Article 4.1 of the Basic Law does not grant the individual any claim against the state 
to protection against "religious insecurity".52 That does not fit together. Could not instead the 
– lamented – practical insignificance of sec. 166 German Criminal Code be a positive sign 
that in our society plurality is not yet endangered? 
Instead of an increase in penalties, there is much more to be said for the opposite, i.e. the 
deletion of the norm. For one can certainly ask oneself whether the equal participation in 
social communication, which has been identified here as a legitimate reason for punishment, 
is not already much better covered by other offences (e.g. sec. 130 German Criminal Code: 






In an open society, in which many religions and world views compete with each other, 
sec. 166 German Criminal Code has to absorb different sensitivities. The fatwa imposed on the 
writer Salman Rushdie impressively proves that other religions and world views have lower 
tolerance thresholds. However, the idea is oppressive that the “Satanic Verses“ could trigger a 
criminal case in Germany. Mill rightly emphasizes that heretical thoughts do not disappear by 
their punishment, but by dealing with them and refuting them.54 Restraint in limiting public 
speech is a sign of a self-conscious society that dares to put those who overstep the 
boundaries of good taste in their place in public debate. 
 
  52 See  in: Maunz/Dürig, GG, 89. Ergänzungslieferung: Oktober 2019, Art. 4, marginal no. 74. 
  53 So , Bekenntnisbeschimpfung (§ 166 StGB): Aufheben oder Ausweiten?, Juristenzeitung 2015, 
p. 293 et seqq. 
  54  (Fn. 24), p. 47 f. 
